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al-Zawahiri’s Line of Succession
By Kévin Jackson
When a U.S. drone strike killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul almost a year ago, al-Qa‘ida was left yet again to find a new emir, eleven years after the death of its founding leader Usama bin Ladin. Al-Zawahiri had long prepared his organization for this moment though. Back in late November-December 2013, he had sent a missive to Jabhat al-Nusra, then al-Qa‘ida’s Syrian affiliate, conveying that “he would be absent for a time from contact for his security circumstances.” In this message, the Egyptian, anticipating his prolonged absence, devised a formal chain of succession in the event of his demise to prevent a void in al-Qa‘ida’s leadership.
Though dated, al-Zawahiri’s succession plan is still the best primary document to study when reflecting on the outlook of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership as it offers invaluable insight into the mindset of the late emir of al-Qa‘ida regarding his replacement. This transitional period appears especially challenging for al-Qa‘ida. After Bin Ladin’s killing, there was no question that al-Zawahiri was his legitimate heir, whereas today the group does not have such an obvious candidate. Further, public calls to “dissolve al-Qa‘ida” have multiplied within the militant milieu over the past few years, therefore making al-Zawahiri’s replacement even more critical to the Central organization in its quest to keep its affiliates’ loyalty and maintain its global reach.
al-Zawahiri’s Chosen Ones
When he outlined how al-Qa‘ida should handle his demise in 2013, al-Zawahiri had no less than four names in mind for his succession, which he ranked as follows: Abu al-Khayr al-Misri; Abu Muhammad al-Misri; Sayf al-‘Adl; and Nasir al-Wuhayshi. His first three choices were all fellow Egyptians with a decades-long history in jihad, which stretched back to Afghanistan in the 1980s. A member of al-Qa‘ida’s Shura Council since 2001, Abu al-Khayr had previously acted as “the main coordinator” between al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian al-Jihad group and al-Qa‘ida. He had long been highly regarded and trusted by al-Qa‘ida’s leaders, including Bin Ladin, to the point that he was privy to the 9/11 plotting. For their part, Abu Muhammad and al-‘Adl held leading roles in al-Qa‘ida’s training, military, security, and external operations committees and were serving in al-Qa‘ida’s Shura Council since the early 1990s. Finally, al-Wuhayshi was the then leader of al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Although al-Zawahiri’s succession plan seemed very Egyptian-centric, it is worth noting that his hierarchy was no different from Bin Ladin’s. In a letter written in September 2010, the latter stated that “Shaykh Abu al-Khayr and Shaykh Abu Muhammad are above our brother (…) Sayf al-‘Adl”. The difference with al-Zawahiri was that, while Bin Ladin considered that al-‘Adl had “efforts that would benefit the jihad and the mujahidin […] in the military work”, he did not see al-‘Adl fit to become the “general manager” or even the deputy manager of al-Qa‘ida, let alone its emir.
At the time al-Zawahiri was crafting his short list, his first three choices were detained in Iran. He had thereby to rely on his fourth candidate, al-Wuhayshi. Since then, “all the branches of al-Qa‘ida know that [al-Wuhayshi] was deputy to Shaykh Ayman, and practiced his competencies entirely because of the absence of Shaykh Ayman,” according to al-Nusra. The release of an Iranian diplomat held hostage by AQAP in Yemen in March 2015 came to revitalize al-Qa‘ida’s top leadership. Indeed, in exchange for their diplomat’s release, Tehran freed six senior al-Qa‘ida figures, including al-Zawahiri’s three successors. Following his subsequent relocation to Syria, Abu al-Khayr shared with al-Nusra “a letter making clear through it that [he] was the successor to Shaykh al-Zawahiri.” As for Abu Muhammad and al-‘Adl, the duo remained in Iran, as they “were barred from departing [the country],” all the while overseeing al-Qa‘ida’s affairs.
Five years later though, al-Zawahiri had lost three of his potential successors: al-Wuhayshi was killed in al-Mukalla, Yemen, on June 12, 2015; Abu al-Khayr was killed in Idlib, Syria, on February 26, 2017; and Abu Muhammad was gunned down in Iran’s capital Tehran on August 7, 2020. Al-‘Adl is thus the only remaining successor picked by al-Zawahiri back in 2013 and the best positioned to take over, at least on paper. In practice, al-‘Adl’s ascension appears compromised by al-Qa‘ida’s own protocols, as al-Zawahiri specified that his heir must be “in Khurasan or one of the branches of the group.” Besides, al-‘Adl’s murky status in Iran has already caused his leadership to be contested internally. In Syria, al-Nusra rebuffed what they viewed as the excessive influence of al-‘Adl and Abu Muhammad precisely because the duo was “present in an enemy country (Iran),” whereas the “organizational principles for al-Qa‘ida itself stipulate that no one can enjoy competencies so long as he is not in one of the branches.” In the aftermath of al-Zawahiri’s death, it was reported that the potential nomination of al-‘Adl was facing a “large number of opponents” inside the al-Qa‘ida camp, a defiance mostly motivated by his longstanding presence in Iran, which is viewed as highly suspicious within jihadi circles.
A few months ago, a report from the U.N. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team asserted that al-‘Adl was now “operating as the de facto and uncontested leader of the group.” The aforementioned al-Qa‘ida regulations and criticism about al-‘Adl are no minor hurdles though and should thus warrant caution regarding this claim. Besides, it would not be the first time that he was erroneously labeled as such. Back in 2011, after the death of Bin Ladin, media reports had already claimed that al-‘Adl had been appointed as the new leader of al-Qa‘ida, even though he was then still detained in Iran. The latest U.N.’s report on Afghanistan alleges that al-‘Adl may have recently relocated to Afghanistan, a development which would significantly help his case. This claim is far from making consensus though. If al-‘Adl were still in Iran with limited freedom of movement, this would likely be viewed as too problematic by the Central organization for him to be the permanent leader, regardless of his seniority or military acumen.
The Shura Council
Since the death of al-Wuhayshi, Abu al-Khayr and Abu Muhammad between 2015 and 2020, al-Zawahiri has had plenty of time to find new candidates (besides al-‘Adl) for his replacement. To be sure, operational security has at times hampered al-Zawahiri’s ability to communicate with the outside world. Yet, his private correspondence with his aides, from Syria to Yemen, and his numerous public statements before his killing suggest that his courier network was functional enough for him to relay a new succession plan during that time frame. It is thus doubtful that al-‘Adl was the only designated successor when al-Zawahiri was killed last year.
While the latter’s updated short list has been kept secret, it is clear that the members of al-Qa‘ida’s Shura Council will play a pivotal role in this transition. Indeed, the organizational guidelines set up by al-Zawahiri state that if none of his options could take over, then “the brothers in the Shura of the general command are to choose a new amir.” Further, it is most likely within this top al-Qa‘ida’s body that al-Zawahiri took new candidates (besides al-‘Adl) for his replacement. Here, it is worth remembering that the first three choices of al-Zawahiri for his succession were all part of the Shura, even though their role had long been limited owing to the restrictions they faced in Iran.
Between March and June 2014, each member of al-Qa‘ida’s Shura took an oath to follow al-Zawahiri’s initial succession plan. Today, only two of these six figures appear to be alive: ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi and Hamza al-Ghamidi.
A former software programming student, al-Maghribi, a Moroccan national, lived in Krefeld, western Germany, before traveling to Afghanistan together with a small group of friends in mid December 1999. Recommended by Karim Mehdi, a German-based Moroccan veteran of al-Qa‘ida’s camps in Afghanistan, al-Maghribi was sent straight to Bin Ladin’s headquarters in Kandahar while his companions were dispatched to a training camp. In Kandahar, al-Maghribi mixed with other jihadis formerly based in Germany, including 9/11 coordinator Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the German convert Christian Ganczarski. Most importantly, al-Maghribi began his longtime career in al-Qa‘ida’s propaganda effort. Described as an “expert in computers” by a close jihadi friend, al-Maghribi was tapped for his background by al-Qa‘ida’s leadership to be part of the group’s media arm al-Sahab, alongside 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), who headed al-Sahab, and 9/11 facilitator Mustafa al-Hawsawi, among others.
Following the arrest of his boss KSM in 2003, al-Maghribi took over al-Sahab and supervised al-Qa‘ida’s media productions, from 9/11 anniversary videos to Adam Gadahn’s public appearances. By 2004, al-Maghribi was married to one of al-Zawahiri’s daughters and was advising Bin Ladin on media issues while also acting as a key aide to al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” Abu al-Faraj al-Libi, notably during the negotiations between the organization and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s group. In July 2010, ‘Atiyyatullah al-Libi, then in charge of al-Qa‘ida in Khurasan, suggested to Bin Ladin to appoint al-Maghribi, by then a member of the Shura, as his first deputy, praising him for his “fine intellect” and being “good for command”. Instead, Bin Ladin enlisted al-Maghribi as ‘Atiyyatullah’s second deputy via a personal letter written on October 21, 2010.
Since then, al-Maghribi further rose to prominence within al-Qa‘ida’s upper echelon, becoming the organization’s “general manager” in 2012 and heading its “external communications office”, according to the U.S. This echoes the accounts of former al-Qa‘ida cadres who portrayed al-Maghribi as al-Qa‘ida’s “engineer” and maintained that the organization was “under the control of both [al-Zawahiri] and his in-law (…) al-Maghribi”. In this perspective, it is probable that al-Maghribi was put on al-Zawahiri’s new list of successors, as indicated by the U.N. report on the global jihadi threat last year which claimed that al-Maghribi was second in line behind al-‘Adl. Nonetheless, al-Maghribi is alleged to have relocated to Iran after years in Pakistan’s tribal areas and will thus face the same challenge as al-‘Adl to rise to the top. It is also worth remembering that when he was offered the position of deputy to the “general manager” in 2010, al-Maghribi initially refused the assignment, forcing Bin Ladin to personally weigh in.
If al-Qa‘ida’s Shura can’t nominate al-‘Adl or al-Maghribi, the organization could still rely on the Saudi Hamza al-Ghamidi. While not a household name, al-Ghamidi can claim a fighting experience and closeness to Bin Ladin that even al-‘Adl can hardly match. Indeed, al-Ghamidi and Bin Ladin fought together as early as 1987 during the “battle of Jaji” and in Jalalabad in 1989. In the early 90s, al-Ghamidi joined the ranks of the Saudi commander Khattab and other fellow Arab-Afghans in their new jihad in Tajikistan. By 1996, al-Ghamidi “was already something of a legend” to his younger peers and tried to reopen the Tajik front, leading a group of Arab jihadis nicknamed “the Northern Group” but to no avail. After this failure, al-Ghamidi functioned as the “immediate commander” of Bin Ladin’s bodyguards under al-‘Adl’s overall leadership. Further, al-Ghamidi was put in charge of al-Qa‘ida’s guesthouse in Kabul’s Wazir Akbar Khan area and dispatched by Bin Ladin “to discuss the possibility of opening fronts” in Central Asia for al-Qa‘ida. Finally, al-Ghamidi had a key role in the emergence of al-Sahab, working alongside al-Maghribi and KSM at al-Qa‘ida’s media office in Kandahar and handling Bin Ladin’s “photo file”. This is illustrated by al-Ghamidi’s attendance at a sermon given by Bin Ladin at Tarnak Farms in January 2000 where the former can be seen staying behind the camera videotaping the event, which would be used as the main outline for al-Sahab’s video celebrating the USS Cole bombing.
In the wake of 9/11, al-Ghamidi continued to be part of Bin Ladin’s inner circle, following his leader in his every move between Kabul, Logar, Jalalabad, and Khost. When the city of Jalalabad fell, it was al-Ghamidi who personally drove Bin Ladin and the rest of his entourage to the mountains of Tora Bora before fleeing to Kunar. There, al-Ghamidi stayed with Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, al-Wuhayshi, and a few others for months until the leader of al-Qa‘ida asked him to travel for unknown reasons around the summer of 2002. Reflecting al-Ghamidi’s reputation within the organization, al-Qa‘ida’s operative Hassan Ghul suspected in 2004 that the Saudi was “one of the three individuals likely to be with” Bin Ladin, along with al-Maghribi and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. At the time, al-Ghamidi had resumed his military activities, assisting al-Qa‘ida’s top military commander Khalid al-Habib in overseeing the organization’s operations in Afghanistan. The next year, he became one of Saudi Arabia’s most wanted jihadis, featuring on a list of 36 operatives sought by the Kingdom. When al-Zawahiri’s succession plan was leaked online in early 2019, al-Ghamidi was revealed to have become one of al-Qa‘ida’s most senior figures, as attested by his membership to the Shura. In September 2021, AQAP’s senior leader Khubayb al-Sudani published a book chronicling the “history of al-Qa‘ida”. Still in touch with his old hierarchy, including al-Zawahiri, al-Sudani disclosed that al-Ghamidi was alive and well, using the traditional formula “may God protect him” under a photo of the Saudi.
It remains to be seen if al-Ghamidi was actually nominated by al-Zawahiri to be on his list of successors. In the 1990s, al-Ghamidi did not think highly of the Egyptians around Bin Ladin, especially al-Zawahiri whom he decried as “pedantic” and “lacking leadership qualities”. To counter the influence of al-Zawahiri and his countrymen, al-Ghamidi sought to “gather the largest number of youths from the Arabian Peninsula around the Shaykh [i.e., Bin Ladin] so that it is not monopolized by the Egyptians,” he once told Aimen Dean, whom he recruited into al-Qa‘ida. But al-Ghamidi’s promotion to the Shura Council during al-Zawahiri’s tenure shows that the two eventually managed to go over their past beef. In July 2016, al-Zawahiri even referred to al-Ghamidi in an audio statement eulogizing al-Wuhayshi as “Shaykh Hamza al-Ghamidi,” a unique public acknowledgment for the low-profile Saudi.
Besides his seniority, al-Ghamidi might appear as an even more promising contender for al-Qa‘ida in the context of the Taliban’s return to power. He has been cultivating ties inside the Afghan militant landscape since the mid 80s, frequenting figures and field commanders from various backgrounds, from Dr. Amin al-Haq, one of Bin Ladin’s main Afghan protectors, to a number of Northern Alliance cadres. Lastly, although unknown to the young generations, al-Ghamidi’s name could still resonate to the older guard in Khurasan and beyond, especially in Yemen and the Gulf, where he reportedly has historical ties. This is further corroborated by the kind words written by al-Wuhayshi in the spring of 2013 to al-Ghamidi, whom he lauded as one of his “brothers in hardships.” In this light, al-Ghamidi might be the most serious aspirant to replace al-Zawahiri, along with al-‘Adl and al-Maghribi.
The Core Rules Supreme
Since the release of the aforementioned U.N. report last year, the emir of al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and that of al-Shabab have often been discussed as viable options for replacing al-Zawahiri as the two are reported to be “next in line of seniority” underneath al-‘Adl and al-Maghribi. However, this scenario appears unlikely. First, as shown above, the succession plan outlined by al-Zawahiri underlines that he only trusted historical figures with longstanding membership to al-Qa‘ida’s core to assume command. Further, should all his designated successors be unavailable, the nomination of a new leader would still lie in the hands of the Shura Council, which will probably also favor an Arab-Afghan figure from the old guard. To be sure, al-Zawahiri did nominate the leader of an affiliate once – AQAP’s al-Wuhayshi – to be in charge in his absence in 2013. Yet, al-Wuhayshi had been a core member since the late 90s when he worked as Bin Ladin’s personal secretary in Afghanistan. Comparatively, the heads of AQIM and al-Shabab appear as outsiders.
Rather than Somalia or the Sahel, the Central organization’s best options outside Khurasan to uphold al-Zawahiri’s legacy appear to be in Yemen and Syria, two fronts where numerous core operatives relocated over the past decade. In Yemen, the mothership could lean on the cohort of core figures in AQAP’s leadership, including its current emir Khalid Batarfi and al-Sudani. In Syria, while most of the top cadres dispatched in the country have been killed, al-Qa‘ida still retains a few leaders of note, such as veteran figures Abu Hammam al-Shami and Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Misri. As opposed to the leaders of AQIM and al-Shabab, these core elements in Yemen and Syria are well-known to al-Qa‘ida’s leaders al-‘Adl, al-Maghribi, and al-Ghamidi, who would likely be more comfortable with leaving the reins to people with whom they share a personal and enduring relationship. On that note, al-‘Adl is alleged to have chosen Batarfi as his nominee for the leadership succession. Nevertheless, it will be difficult for the Central organization to overlook its Syria-based loyalists and AQAP’s poor performances in their respective operational areas over the past few years, especially in Syria where the al-Qa‘ida contingent appears largely inactive, thus making the scenario of a takeover by the Syrian affiliate highly unlikely.
Al-Qa‘ida’s Syrian experience further undermines the likelihood of a takeover from a franchise. After his relocation to Syria in 2015, Abu al-Khayr began consulting with the Iran-based deputies Abu Muhammad and al-‘Adl regarding “forming a committee for the leadership in the shade of the absence of [al-Zawahiri].” After months of discussion, the trio decided to set up two new bodies: a “leadership committee” comprised of al-Zawahiri’s three deputies; and a “consultation council” which included, among others, the two top leaders of each al-Qa‘ida’s affiliates. While the decisions taken by the majority of the “leadership committee” would be binding, the role of “the consultation council … was to be advisory.” Although al-Qa‘ida does seek its subsidiaries’ input on important issues, this episode illustrates the limits of the organization’s inclusiveness in its decision-making and highlights its unwillingness to relinquish its executive powers, wanting to have the final say in strategic matters. Media reports indicate that the mothership might have probed its subordinates regarding their opinion on the most qualified successor to al-Zawahiri. Yet, owing to al-Qa‘ida’s style of management, it is most likely that the final decision will ultimately fall to the small cadre of al-Qa‘ida’s leaders between the Af-Pak region and Iran.
To Announce or Not to Announce
Almost a year after al-Zawahiri’s death, al-Qa‘ida has remained silent on the issue. While others in the militant milieu have since acknowledged his demise, the organization, for its part, contented itself to release a number of media materials, including from al-‘Adl and al-Zawahiri, but without any mention regarding the latter’s current status. Given the number of months that passed since the drone strike and this media activity, it is doubtful that al-Qa‘ida has not chosen a new leader and is unable to announce the news.
Instead, this absence of communication has likely much more to do with the predicament it finds itself in with regard to its Taliban allies. Given that the latter have yet to admit al-Zawahiri’s killing and repeatedly denied the presence of al-Qa‘ida inside Afghanistan, an unauthorized public announcement from the organization could lead it to be castigated as insubordinate guests jeopardizing their Afghan hosts’ engagement with the international community. On the other hand, while it would relieve the Taliban, hiding the death of its emir and the appointment of a new one would likely be viewed by al-Qa‘ida’s leadership as damaging to the group’s brand and internal cohesion at a time when it needs to give reassurances to its constituency.
Al-Qa‘ida’s current silence suggests that as important as communicating on al-Zawahiri’s death might be for al-Qa‘ida, the leaders of the organization have decided to comply with their hosts’ wishes. It remains to be seen for how long.
Kévin Jackson is the Research Director at the Centre d’Analyse du Terrorisme (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism) and is a contributor at Jihadica. You can follow him on Twitter @alleyesonjihad.