NOTE: For prior parts in The Archivist series you can view an archive of it all here. And for his older series see: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad.
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“Go Forth, Lightly and Heavily Armed”: New Mobilization Calls by the Islamic State in Aleppo Province
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction: Context and Analysis
With the intensification of Russia’s overt intervention inside Syria, regime forces and allied militias have launched multiple offensives in the north of Syria. One of these offensives is taking place in Aleppo province and has three primary aims: to expand the line of control to the southwest of Aleppo city, to attempt (again) to complete the encirclement of Aleppo city and break the rebel sieges of the Shi’a villages of Nubl and Zahara’ to the northwest of Aleppo city, and finally to push eastwards against the Islamic State [IS] and break IS’ long-standing siege of Kweiris military airbase.
The question of the Iranian involvement in the new Aleppo offensives is the subject of some debate. Though there have been reports of deployments of thousands of Iranian ground troops, it should be noted that such a move does not suit Iranian modus operandi in Syria, which prefers to rely on proxies to supply the bulk of manpower under elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps supervision. Note the following post from the main Facebook page for Quwat al-Ridha (native Syrian Hezbollah primarily recruiting from the Shi’a in Homs province) on 18 October, which leaves no doubt as to who the main ground commander of the new Aleppo operations is:
“Kweiris airbase, in front of the Commander Qasim Suleimani’s eye. The plans have been put in place, the equipment and munitions have been prepared, and the soldiers have entered the operation stage. The leader of the Quds Force, General Qasim Suleimani, is beginning his path to liberate and break the siege of the legendary airbase, Kweiris airbase. And participating in this operation are Quwat al-Ridha from Homs al-Abiya, Quwat al-Nujaba’ [Harakat al-Nujaba’, an Iraqi Shi’a militia], the Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces and forces from the Syrian Arab Army, under air-cover from the Russian Bear. My friends in Kweiris airbase, Suleimani is coming for you.”
Besides Harakat al-Nujaba’, which has been a long-established player on the Aleppo fronts, an official from Kata’ib Hezbollah– another Iraqi proxy of Iran- claimed to the Washington Post that 1000 fighters have been sent as part of Suleimani’s Aleppo offensive. Newer, more obscure Iraqi militias that have been advertising recruitment to fight in Syria in recent months may also be supplying manpower to the Aleppo area. The Assad Allah al-Ghalib Forces, an Iraqi Shi’a militia that initially operated in the Damascus area as part of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, also appears to have a presence in the Aleppo area.
The combination of manpower boosts and Russian air support helped score gains against both rebels and IS, but as shown by the unseen documents I have obtained, IS has responded to the eastward push by launching new mobilization calls within Aleppo province (Wilayat Halab), including the opening of new training camps. Linked to these mobilization calls has been the launch of IS counter-offensives that are threatening to cut regime supply lines to Aleppo city, including ongoing clashes in the vicinity of the regime stronghold of al-Safira and IS assaults further southward along the Khanaser-Athariya road heading into Hama province.
Previously, the last major mobilization call that produced results for IS took place in late April, with an internal directive issued by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi throughout the Syrian provinces to reinforce the fighting fronts in Salah ad-Din and Anbar provinces [archive: Specimen 3E], with particular emphasis on recruitment of suicide bombers and commandoes. Some weeks later, the mobilization call took the form of an official al-Furqan Media speech from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The aims of IS were clear: continue the stalemate in Baiji in northern Salah ad-Din province and pin down Iraqi forces, while intensifying the assaults on Ramadi, where Shi’a militia deployments were very limited, in a bid to take control of the city. After all, as the provincial capital of Anbar province, Ramadi undoubtedly has greater value than Baiji, where the oil refinery and town infrastructure have largely been destroyed.
In the overall analysis, one should not overstate the IS capacity to mobilize and launch new offensives. It is impossible to commit with the same degree of intensity on every front where IS faces enemy forces. That said, for Aleppo province at least, IS’ enemies- rebels and regime forces- do not have the ability to pose a serious threat to IS’ main strongholds. With the rebels in particular, disorganization in the ranks (witness the case of the Shami Front and its multiple fractures) and a two-way war have meant that the overall trend is that IS has pushed ever further westward, though it is unlikely that the international coalition will allow IS to reclaim its one-time ‘Emirate of Azaz.’
Among the specimen documents of the new mobilization call are the first documents I have seen from an IS “Shari’a Committee” since the declaration of the Caliphate. The Aleppo province Shari’a Committee may be a provincial manifestation of IS’ greater Shari’a Council. On this analytical reading, the Diwan al-‘Eftaa wa al-Buhuth (fatwa issuing and research department: also Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-‘Eftaa) in Aleppo province may be a subset of the Aleppo province Shari’a Committee, just as the greater Diwan al-‘Eftaa wa al-Buhuth is reportedly a subset of the greater Shari’a Council.
Perhaps in support of this reading, one can note that based on the dates given, the mobilization call from the Aleppo province Shari’a Committee comes first (1 Muharram 1437 AH) and then further details- including specifics on locations- are given by the Diwan al-‘Eftaa wa al-Buhuth statements, one of which is dated 6 Muharram 1437 AH.
