Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Wilāyat Dara’ā — “Alert From Your Brothers”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
UPDATE 5/24/13 10:08 AM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Talḥah al-Lībī — “Oh Hamas, Fear God” (Ar)
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NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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By Phillip Smyth
Hizballah Cavalcade: Hizballah’s Multiplying Qusayr Martyrs
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Figure 1: Hizballah fighters pose under a road sign pointing to the Syrian city of Qusayr. (Source: Facebook).
On April 30, 2013, Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah finally made an official announcement signifying Hizballah would become more greatly involved in the Syrian Civil War. Coinciding with his speech were a number of Facebook, pro-Hizballah forum, and other online webpage posts (often with photographs) showing funerals of Hizballah members. These posts had also occurred for well over a month prior to the Nasrallah speech. While Hizballah had been more publicly involved in the conflict in Syria since the summer of 2012 (with the announcement of the first Hizballah members killed in Syria), the speech appeared to be the first truly publicized acknowledgement of what was originally covert Hizballah activity inside Syria.
The weekend spanning May 18-20, 2013 was one filled with martyrdom announcements from Lebanese Hizballah. These announcements coincided with some of the heaviest fighting witnessed since the start of an over-a-month-long, combined pro-Bashar Assad, and Hizballah offensive. This offensive targeted the strategic area of Qusayr. Qusayr serves as a communications link between Syria’s hilly coastal ‘Alawi heartland, Lebanon’s Hizballah-dominated Bekka Valley, and Syria’s capital, Damascus.[1]
Hizballah often obscures the activities of its fighters in Syria. When a Hizballah member is killed, the phrase, “Killed while performing jihad duties” is regularly utilized by the organization as a description for how and why the member died.
As the Qusayr offensive picked-up steam, the numbers of Hizballah dead multiplied greatly. On May 19, 2013, Hizballah officially released a list of 12 Hizballah members killed.[2] On the other hand, Pro-rebel sources claimed anywhere from 20-120 Hizballah members were killed. Hizballah Facebook pages posted different numbers, ranging from 8-15 killed. Additionally, not all of the newly killed Hizballah members had photographs of themselves posted online.
Pro-Hizballah Facebook groups have taken the brunt of responsibility in spreading the news of new Hizballah dead. These pages are often the first to post photographs of Hizballah’s fallen. In turn, pro-Hizballah Facebook pages demonstrate a high level of online organization. Posts announcing newly killed Hizballah members on different pro-Hizballah Facebook pages often occur within minutes of each other. Honing Hizballah’s message further, these pages also share similar photographs. Such activity underlines how information is vetted and then conveyed to the public about those killed. This fact may also demonstrate official Hizballah involvement in announcements of their dead on Facebook.
There are other dead Hizballah members who were killed in Qusayr before the turbulent weekend. However, the posted list includes individuals who were announced by Hizballah as “Martyred” during the fighting from May 18-20, 2013. Currently (May 20, 2013, 12:00PM EST), that number stands at 20 (though, it may be updated with more information). Additionally, only names which could be cross-referenced using a variety of Hizballah sources were incorporated. These sources included pro-Hizballah Facebook pages, Iranian websites, pro-Hizballah forums, official, and semi-official websites.
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Name: Hassan Faysal Shaker
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Shaker’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts. Shaker was originally listed as killed-in-action in an official Hizballah announcement. The announcement reported a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. This photo was the only one released and could only be found on pro-Hizballah Facebook pages and on pro-Hizballah forums.
Name: (Al-Haj) Muhammed Salman al-Khalil
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Khalil’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts.
Name: Muhammed Ali Assad Bakri
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Bakri’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts.
Name: Abbas Muhammed Uthman
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Uthman’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts. He was one of 12 dead, who were named in the official Hizballah notice.
Name: Fadi Muhammed al-Jazar
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: One pro-Hizballah Facebook page reported Jazar was killed fighting in Qusayr. This was one of the first announcements of a Hizballah fighter being killed in that area. The Times of Israel reported Jazar was a Hizballah “Field commander” at Qusayr and from 1991-2004 he was jailed by Israeli authorities after attacking Israeli positions on the Israel-Lebanon border. Jazar was part of a prisoner exchange in 2004.
Name: Muhammed Fouad Raba’
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Raba’’s photo shows him holding a modified M4 carbine and posing in front of the 23mm quad-cannon toting ZSU-23 anti-aircraft gun. Raba’ was part of an official Hizballah announcement that a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. This photo was the only one released and could only be found on pro-Hizballah Facebook pages.
Name: Ibrahim Husayn (A.K.A. Abu Ali or Hatem Husayn)
Death Announced: May 18, 2013
Notes: Husayn’s death was announced as part of an official Hizballah announcement that a group of Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. On two pro-Hizballah Facebook pages, it was claimed that Husayn’s death occurred while “Defending the Zaynab Shrine”. This is a common narrative used to describe Hizballah members who have been killed in Syria. However, it is possible that Husayn could have been serving in Damascus with Hizballah-staffed front groups like Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. Other dead Hizballah members from the weekend of May 18-19 did not repeat the claims of that note with their Facebook martyrdom announcement posts. The official website for the town of Bint Jbeil (which is Hizballah controlled) did not report that Husayn was killed defending the Zaynab Shrine. On May 20, an official Iranian website for the Young Journalists Club, reported Husayn was a Hizballah commander.
Name: Hassan Ali al-Shahrour
Death Announced: May 18, 2013. Funeral held on May 18, 2013.
Notes: According to YaHala.org, a pro-Hizballah website, Shahrour’s funeral was attended by many senior Shia religious leaders. Al-Ahed, one of Hizballah’s official news organs, reported that Hizballah MP Muhammed Ra’ad attended the funeral. This was the likely due to the fact that Ra’ad represents Nabatiyeh in Lebanon’s parliament. Photos were posted on Facebook pages, YaHala.org, and BintJbeil.org.
Figure 2: Shahrour’s funeral was led by members of the Mahdi Scouts (Hizballah’s official scouting program). To the right of Shahrour’s posters, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini is pictured on another poster.
Name: (al-Haj) Ahmed Wael Ra’ad
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. Ra’ad was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: (al-Haj) Radhwan al-‘Attar
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. ‘Attar was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Hassan Hariri
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. Hariri was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Radhi al-Sha’er
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Hariri was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Hussein ‘Amar Yaghi
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Yaghi was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Abu Saman Qasas
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Qasas was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Muhammed
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To inquire about a translation for this nashīd for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. Click here for part one of ‘Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria’.
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By Phillip Smyth
Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2
The latest installment of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria demonstrates a more publicly acknowledged level of Iranian involvement. Two bodies of Iraqi Shia fighters killed in Syria were returned to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq border. Family members of one of the dead Iraqis told the Associated Press that he had gone to Iran before heading to Syria.[1]
The make-up of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s (LAFA) — a Syrian-based Shia militant group—membership was also exposed. Demonstrating a slight departure from earlier martyrdom announcements, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) more broadly acknowledged that their fighters in Syria operate exclusively under LAFA’s moniker. Earlier announcements listed only one of AAH fighters as serving with LAFA.
Three of the Iraqis killed were reportedly not claimed as members by any Iraqi Shia parties (including pro-Iranian Iraq-based groups). This partially fits with LAFA’s narrative that they are staffed by volunteer fighters from throughout the Shia Islamic world. However, with the recent revelations, it becomes clearer that LAFA fighters are most likely vetted and trained by Iran before heading off to fight in Syria.
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Name: Ala’a Muhsen Shahib al-Tamimi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook.
Name: Ali Abdul al-Wahid ‘Awlan
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook on May 16, 2013.
Notes: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
Name: Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (A.K.A. Mohammed Aboud)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Elaph.com, Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki was a 27 year old Iraqi from Basra. Elaph also said he was not claimed by any Iraqi organization as a member. It was also reported by the Associated Press that Aboud went to Iran before heading to fight in Syria. Maliki’s body and that of fellow fighter Hassan Ali Farhud were also transferred back to Iraq via Iran. Since it was announced he was killed fighting around Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine, it is possible he was fighting as a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. One released photo of Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, which was posted on pro-Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al Abbas Facebook pages, also claimed he belonged to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The released photo may also point to al-Maliki’s training influences. Holding the magazine of the rifle is a common fire-control technique used by Hizballah and is featured in a number of their propaganda videos.
Name: Hassan Ali Farhud
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas* (?)
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Al-Sumaria News, Farhud was a 32 year old from Basra, Iraq. His body, along with Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (see above) were returned to Iraq via Iran. It is unknown whether he engaged in training in Iran or which group he served with. Since it was reported he was killed fighting around the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus, it can be assumed he was part of Liw’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. At the time this was written, no photos of Farhud were released.
Name: Diya Mutasher al-Issawi
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 5, 2013. Funeral held on May 6, 2013.
Notes: The Iraq-based Buratha News Agency reported the 30 year old was originally from Iraq’s Basra province. Issawi was not claimed by any Iraqi party as a member. Also, it is unknown whether Issawi was trained in Iran or elsewhere.
[1] “Bombings at Sunni mosque and funeral kill 47 in Iraq”, Associated Press, May 17, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-in-southern-city-mourn-2-shiite-fighters-killed-in-syria/2013/05/17/a53d1988-bece-11e2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html.
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Making its first appearances in the fall of 2012, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades or LAFA) represents a new addition to the Syrian battlefield and serves as another example of increased sectarianism in the Syrian Civil War. The organization claims its role is to defend the Sayida Zaynab Shrine and surrounding Shia populated neighborhoods located in southern Damascus.[1] The group is made-up of a mixture of a small number of native Syrian Shia with a majority of foreign Shia Muslim fighters.
LAFA has also maintained an outward appearance which mirrors the same type of spirit once found with the volunteer International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Despite the presented narrative, this does not necessitate the group is an ad hoc collection of individual Shia Muslims. The group heavily utilizes fighters originating from Iranian-backed organizations (such as Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq), has uniformed personnel, new weapons, a recognizable leadership structure, and openly identifies with Lebanese Hizballah. These factors point to an extremely organized fighting group and deeper levels of Iranian involvement in the organization.
Unlike larger and more established militant Shia Islamist groups such as Lebanon’s Hizballah or Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, LAFA has no official website or official online forums. The group finds most of its internet representation through a mixture of quasi-official Facebook pages and YouTube stations. In fact, for the Western and Arabic-language press, LAFA’s existence only came to light when a YouTube music video featuring the group’s fighters was made public.[2] Thus, fifteen pro-LAFA Facebook pages, five Facebook pages associated with Lebanese Hizballah, one Hizballah forum, three pro-Muqtada al-Sadr forums, and five pro-LAFA/pro-Hizballah YouTube stations were reviewed for this study.
“Labayka Ya Zaynab!”: Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Messaging Campaign & Narrative
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Much discussion arose last month when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Iraqi al-Qa’ida branch Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) declared that his group and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are in fact one and the same, prompting Sheikh Jowlani of JAN to reply that he was not consulted on this decision, while pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri and making clear the links between ISI and JAN.
It is likely that the decision to have an ISI-JAN merger announced was Zawahiri’s idea. From this likely supposition, many commentators claimed a turning point in JAN’s fortunes in Syria for the worse. Thus did Brian Fishman attempt to draw an analogy with Iraq, asserting: “It wouldn’t be the first time he [Zawahiri] botched the terror group’s strategy in the region.”
Fishman’s analogy is that the al-Qa’ida pledge in Iraq inevitably translated to brutalization of local Sunnis, which, along with “U.S. pressure” on al-Qa’ida, proved the decisive turning point against al-Qa’ida after the rise of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. Hence he concludes, “For better or worse, the reckoning between al-Qa’ida’s Syria affiliate and other rebel groups is beginning.”
However, I contend that this view is well overblown. “Syria is/is not Iraq” is of course a statement frequently brought up in common debates over whether the outside world should intervene in militarily or provide lethal aid to rebel forces. The problem is that the general debate over comparisons of Syria to Iraq does not appreciate that the dynamics of how the civil war progressed in Iraq are vastly different from Syria.
Iraq’s sectarian civil war was focused on what might be termed a decisive ‘Battle for Baghdad’ between rival Sunni and Shi’a militias, with the former- demographically in a minority- believing that Sunni Arabs were in fact the majority and could win that civil war. By the end of 2006, large-scale ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad had convinced many insurgents who had been working with al-Qa’ida that they could not win, and hence a key driving force behind the turn against al-Qa’ida.
On a side note, I should point out that the belief in a Sunni Arab majority in Iraq is by no means dead, and is back on the ascendancy, being promoted by some mainstream Sunni Arab politicians like Osama al-Nujaifi and by groups organizing demonstrations such as Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI).
IAAI is essentially the activist wing of the neo-Ba’athist Naqshibandi militia movement. Concomitant with that belief in a Sunni Arab majority is the notion of marching on Baghdad to retake the city and calling for jihad, sentiments apparent at IAAI protests in areas like Hawija and Tikrit.
In any case, the development of Syria’s civil war is not analogous. For one thing, the timescale is much greater than in Iraq, and Sunni insurgents in Syria are not a minority who falsely believe they are in the majority.
False analogies with Iraq aside, an overview of statements made by various other rebel groups as well as developments on the ground show that nothing has changed for the worse for JAN. Beginning with the issue of statements on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, the sentiment can be summarized as follows: ‘While we appreciate your efforts against the regime, we do not believe a pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida is in anyone’s interests.’ Thus, not a repudiation of JAN itself, but just al-Qa’ida.
Consider, for example, a statement (courtesy of Charles Lister) put out by a Deir ez-Zor battalion known as the Jaish al-Tawhid, which is aligned with the Salafist rebel coalition called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). The statement read: “As for Jabhat al-Nusra’s allegiance to al-Qa’ida, this is a matter for their concern, even though we do not support them [in it] as they have come to hold this view, and we recognize that Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Sheikh al-Zawahiri is a course of action that does not achieve legitimate interests.”
In a similar vein, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya– one of the largest battalions in the SIF- recently put out a statement indicating that they did not approve of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a merger between ISI and JAN, saying that his announcement was not done in consultation with any proper religious authorities in Syria.
At the same time, the battalion made clear its appreciation of “the self-sacrifice and courage of Jabhat al-Nusra in battles and its good deeds and the goodness of its treatment of the people,” declared to be advancing “the interests of the Ummah.”
Notably, the statement recognizes the risks of conflict spreading in the wider region, but makes clear that “this does not constitute an arbitrary judgment for the artificial borders between the sons of the Ummah.” In other words, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya does not see the notion of an ideological project beyond Syria’s borders as somehow illegitimate.
Coming to reactions outside this Salafist framework, we have the case of a statement put out immediately after JAN’s al-Qa’ida pledge by a self-proclaimed Free Syrian Army military council in the Damascus area, indicating that while JAN is not part of its structure, “its role in the defense of our oppressed people facing the regime of the tyrant [Assad] is valued.”
The al-Furqan Brigades likewise weighed in on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida. Their statement cited Qur’an 5:51, “O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends; they are in fact friends of each other. And whosoever among you takes them [as friends] is one of them; and verily God does not guide the people of wrongdoers.”
وردني سؤال عن جدوى تنفيذ عمليات عسكرية داخل الأراضي الإيرانية وفيما يلي جواب مختصر عن ذلك
نقل المعركة لأرض العدو مطلب مهم في أي حرب حتى تتوازن كفة الرعب ويذوق الذي تذوقه ولكن يختلف تأثير ذلك من بلد لآخر فالدول الغربية تتأثر كثيرا بالعمليات الداخلية اقتصاديا وأمنيا وسياسيا وبكل النواحي وحادثة محاولة تفجيرالطائرة في “ديترويت” في أمريكا خير دليل على ذلك فمع ان العملية لم تنجح إلا انها تسببت في انفاق 40 مليار دولار على تشديد اجراءات السلامة في المطارات !
أما الدول الشرقية فهي غالبا لا تتأثر بالعمليات الداخلية لأن الأنظمة الشمولية والمافيوية كالصين وروسيا لا تقييم وزنا كبيرا للعامل البشري على عكس الدول الغربية التي قد تسقط حكوماتها بسبب التهاون في سلامة مواطنيها ! ولعل حادثة مسرح موسكو وميدان “تيانامن” ففي الأولى فتح الروس الغازات السامة داخل المسرح لانهاء عملية احتجاز الرهائن التي أخذت بعدا اعلاميا عالميا وأعادت تسليط الضوء على الحرب في الشيشان وتداعياتها التي جعلت مجموعة القائد عربي باراييف تقوم بمثل هذه المهمة فقامت القوات الخاصة الروسية بفتح الغاز وتسببت بموت 200 رهينة روسي لتنهي المسألة بدون أن تتأثر بموتهم لطبيعة النظام الذي لا يقيم وزنا لهم أساسا وكذلك الحال في المظاهرات الطلابية في ميدان تيانامن في الصين والتي قام الجيش بادخال الدبابات لسحق جثت الطلبة المعتصمين دون أي رحمة ! فمثل هذه التعديات لا يمكن أن تحدث إلا في مثل هذه الأنظمة الشرقية أما الأهداف الذي تتأثر بضربها كثيرا هذه الأنظمة فهي الأهداف الإقتصادية وخير مثال على ذلك ما حدث في الغزو السوفيتي لأفغانستان فعندما كان يقتل الآلاف من الجنود الروس لم تبدي موسكو تأثرا ولكن عندما طالت الحرب واستنزف الاقتصاد وبدأت المتاعب لم تمضي سنوات إلا وتفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي كسبب غير مباشر للإنفاق على حرب أفغانستان !
وإيران تصنف من القسم الثاني الذي لا يقيم وزنا كبيرا للعنصر البشري بالمقارنة مع الاقتصاد وما حدث في الحرب العراقية الإيرانية في الثمانينات يؤكد ذلك فقد قاد خوميني الحرب باسلوب الأمواج البشرية كي يقتحم التحصينات العراقية فكان الهجوم يبدأ ب 20 ألف مقاتل على شكل سلاسل وأمواج متلاحقة ليربك الجيش العراقي ومع أنه اسلوب بدائي إلا أنه حقق بعض النتائج ويكفي تخيل هذه المعارك لندرك مدى رخص مواطني إيران عند ملاليهم
ولذا اعتقد ان دعم الجهاد في سوريا سيكون له بالغ الأثر على إيران أكثر من أي عمليات داخل الأراضي الإيرانية – إلا ان استهدفت هذه العمليات أهداف اقتصادية – لأن سوريا الآن هي مسرح استنزاف اقتصادي مستمر لإيران فهي من تنفق على الحرب وعلى بقاء النظام وإن كانت تغطي ذلك من حليفها المالكي بالعراق إلا أنها خسارة لها في النهاية فهذه المليارات التي تنفقها إيران من خزينة النفط العراقي على الحرب في سوريا وعلى كسب ولاء مصر واغراء الأردن كان من الممكن ان تصب في خزينتها أو أن تقاوم بها العقوبات الاقتصادية المفروضة عليها بدرجة أكبر ! ولذا يمكن ان نقول أن قتالنا ضد إيران في سوريا هو كقتالنا ضد السوفيت في أفغانستان فكما أن الجهاد الأفغاني قد تسبب في تفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي فإن الجهاد الشامي سيؤدي بإذن الله إلى تفكك الهلال الشيعي وانكماشه ومن ثم تفكك إيران نفسها باستقلال البلوش والأحواز والأذريين كما حدث في انهيار المعسكر الشيوعي بعد حرب أفغانستان وتحرر أوربا الشرقية ومن ثم تفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي وانكماشه في روسيا الإتحادية والله أعلم
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
