New release from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī: “Ruling On Going To Fight In Azerbaijan”

والمفروض أن تكون الإجابة على مثل هذا السؤال معروفة عند كل مجاهد يقاتل في سبيل الله!
فيكفي الموحد أن يعلم أن القتال في أذربيجان؛ قتال في غير سبيل الله!
ليبطل هذا القتال ويبرأ منه.
فكيف حين تكون حقيقة هذا القتال أنه تثبيت لعرش طاغوت حاكم بغير ما أنزل الله!
من جنس من يقاتلون لإعادة ما يُسمى بالشرعية في اليمن؛ وفي ليبيا؛ ومن جنس من قاتل مع رباني وسياف ليقيم دولتهم الديمقراطية! ومن جنس قتال من قاتلوا صدام ليعيدوا حكم آل الصباح! ومن جنس من يقاتل ضد بشار ليستبدله بطاغوت آخر يحكم بالديمقراطية!

وهؤلاء جميعهم يقاتلون تحت رايات عمية ؛ومن قتل منهم وهو يقاتل لشيء من هذه الغايات الباطلة أو الشركية أوالجاهلية؛ فقتلته وميتته جاهلية.
قال الله تعالى:(إن الذين توفاهم الملائكة ظالمي أنفسهم قالوا فيم كنتم قالوا كنا مستضعفين في الأرض
قالوا ألم تكن أرض الله واسعة فتهاجروا فيها فأولئك مأواهم جهنم وساءت مصيرا)

وعن أبي موسى الأشعري-رضي الله عنه- قال: «سُئِلَ رَسُولُ الله صلى الله عليه وسلم عَنْ الرَّجُلِ: يُقَاتِلُ شَجَاعَةً، وَيُقَاتِلُ حَمِيَّةً، وَيُقَاتِلُ رِيَاءً، أَيُّ ذَلِكَ فِي سَبِيلِ الله؟
فَقَالَ رَسُولُ الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: مَنْ قَاتَلَ لِتَكُونَ كَلِمَةُ الله هِيَ الْعُلْيَا، فَهُوَ فِي سَبِيلِ الله»

فمن قاتل لتكون كلمة الله هي العليا فهو المجاهد في سبيل الله؛
ومن قاتل لتكون كلمة طاغوت من الطواغيت هي العليا والمهيمنة والحاكمة في البلد؛فهو المقاتل في سبيل الطاغوت؛ وقتاله هو القتال الجاهلي؛مهما برره له وزوقه وحسنه علماء السلطان أوردغان!

فأنا أعلم أن شيوخ الإرجاء ؛وأذناب أوردغان؛ سيغروا الشباب بجواز القتال في أذريبيجان! ولا غرابة عندي في ذلك؛ ففساد الأصول يورث لا محالة ؛فسادا في الفروع ولا بد!
فمن رأى الحاكم بأمر العلمانية؛ والساعي لتحقيق الأهداف الأتاتوركية ؛من رآه مسلما مجتهدا!
فسيرى أنّ القتال بتوجيهاته قتالا مشروعا!
وهذا بناء فاسد حتى لو صح إسلامه؛فإنه إذا تقرر أن القتال لتثبيت عرش طاغوت يحكم بغير ما أنزل الله؛ قتال في سبيل الطاغوت؛فلا طاعة في هذا القتال لمخلوق في معصية الخالق؛ولا استجابة فيه لا لحاكم مسلم؛ ولا لعلماني.

‏وإذا استدل لك بعض من يسعون لإضلالك بقصةقتال الزبير رضي الله عنه مع النجاشي قبل إسلامه! ضد عدو نزل به!
فهي قصة لا تثبت ولا تصح!
والذي ثبت هو أن الزبير رضي الله عنه؛ عامَ وسبح ليأتي بخبر المعركة؛ ومن انتصر بها وحسب.
فقولوا للمستدل بها:أثبِت العرش ثم انقش!
ومالم تثبت العرش فنقشك مائل باطل عاطل.

________________

Source: Telegram

To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email: [email protected]

The Islamic State’s Bayat Campaign

In the aftermath of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s death, I noted that the Islamic State (IS) was likely to start a bayat campaign for its new Caliph Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Beginning November 2, IS’s official Telegram channels began posting such bayat.

There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.

The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.

This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.

November 2, 2019:

Wilāyat Saynā’

al-Binghāl

November 3, 2019:

Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl

November 4, 2019:

Wilāyat Bākistān

Wilāyat al-Yaman – al-Bayḍā’

November 5, 2019:

Wilāyat al-Shām – Ḥawrān

Wilāyat Khurāsān

November 6, 2019:

Tūnis

November 7, 2019:

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Nījīrīā

Wilāyat al-Shām – Ḥimṣ

Wilāyat al-Shām – al-Khayr

Wilāyat al-Shām – al-Raqqah

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyyah

November 8:

Wilāyat al-Shām – Ḥimṣ

November 9:

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Mālī and Būrkīnāfāsū

Wilāyat al-Shām – al-Barakah

November 12, 2019:

Wilāyat al-Shām – Ḥalab

November 14, 2019:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Shamāl Baghdād

November 15, 2019:

Wilāyat Lībīyā

November 16, 2019:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Dijlah

November 17, 2019: 

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Diyālā‎

November 18, 2019: 

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn

November 19, 2019: 

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Karkūk

November 22, 2019: 

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā – Indūnīsīyā

November 29, 2019:

Adhirbayjān

New video message from The Islamic State: “And The [Best] Outcome Is For The Righteous – Azerbaijan”

For prior parts in this video series see: Wilāyat Khurāsān, Wilāyat al-Qawqāz, Wilāyat Sharq Asīā, Wilāyat Saynā’, and Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah. The title of this release is in reference to a part of Qur’anic verses 7:128, 11:49, and 28:83.


________________

Source: Telegram

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

The Clear Banner: The Forgotten Fighters: Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

The Clear Banner sub-blog on Jihadology.net is primarily focused on Sunni foreign fighting. It does not have to just be related to the phenomenon in Syria. It can also cover any location that contains Sunni foreign fighters. If you are interested in writing on this subject please email me at azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

The Forgotten Fighters: Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
By North Caucasus Caucus
This article, the first of two parts, will focus on the activities of Azerbaijani foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq in 2014 – their leadership, units, and overall trends. The follow-up will focus on the impact of the conflict in Syria on the Azerbaijani domestic scene and the Azerbaijani government’s response.
My first article on Azerbaijani foreign fighters for Jihadology was published in January 2014 and focused on their activities since the beginning of the conflict in Syria. Several incidents that occurred around that time caused the Azerbaijani mainstream media to begin actively covering developments relating to the actions of their countrymen in Syria. The most prominent such incident occurred on 03 January 2014, when the Islamic Front attack on the Sheikh Suleyman Islamic State (IS) training camp led to the death of six Azerbaijani foreign fighters. During the infighting, some Azerbaijani  fighters were reportedly taken hostage, but they were still texting friends in Azerbaijan who posted their messages on Facebook. At this time, Azerbaijani journalists began to follow the social media postings of fighters in Syria regularly.

Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters 2014 d3
Since then, the main source of information about the activities and views of fighters has shifted from their own social media postings to mainstream media coverage.  With this shift, a problem has arisen of parsing fact from misinterpretation, as well as the general lack of fact-checking endemic to the Azerbaijani media. I have tried to corroborate press reports with social media reporting whenever possible. Repeatedly throughout 2014, the Azerbaijani media published photos of fighters as having recently been killed, when in fact they had been killed up to a year earlier. There were also indications as early as February 2014 that Azerbaijani foreign fighters were aware of the scrutiny of their online activities and were in some cases counting on the media helping to distribute their messages or videos.
One somewhat surprising trend that has held since the publication of my last article is that there have been no confirmed reports of Azerbaijani citizens fighting with pro-government Shi’a units in Syria or Iraq, despite Shi’a making up approximately 70% of Azerbaijan’s population (though the occasional news story on the trend is still occasionally published). Instead, all confirmed Azerbaijani foreign fighters in Syria have fought with Sunni rebel groups, and many with IS in particular. Although an Azerbaijani Sunni news website posted the names of eight Azerbaijanis from Nardaran, the center of conservative Shiism in Azerbaijan, and claimed they had been killed in Syria, leaders from Nardaran denied the story. No visual evidence has emerged to corroborate it and the claims remain questionable considering the source. The impact of Syria on sectarian issues within Azerbaijan will be covered in-depth in a follow-up to this piece.
Hometowns and Numbers
Despite some very prominent databases overlooking Azerbaijani foreign fighters, leading to their exclusion from several prominent infographics, they continue to have a presence in Syria and Iraq. Azerbaijani media outlets consistently report that close to 200 Azerbaijanis have died fighting in Syria since the beginning of the conflict. An April 2014 estimate put the number of Azerbaijanis in Syria at approximately 250. In May 2014, according to a survey of 40 police districts in Azerbaijan, 104 people were identified as having gone to fight in Syria, with 60 killed. In December, the Azerbaijani Border Service reported that 30 returning former fighters had been detained throughout the year.
Along with fellow analysts, I have identified 216 Azerbaijani foreign fighters and their family members in Syria (88 killed, including 64 in 2014 alone, 49 returned, of whom 40 were arrested, 66 still in Syria or Iraq, and 13 whose status is unknown). The number is likely higher since this database only includes fighters and their family members with some unique personal identifying information.
The hometowns of fighters remain relatively consistent with the data from 2013. According to the survey of police districts mentioned above, of the 104 identified by police, 40 were from Sumqayit, 22 from Shabran, and 15 from Qusar. Other locations mentioned in the police report were Xacmaz, Zaqatala, Qax, Yevlax, Oguz, Quba, and Sheki. From my own data, Baku, Terter, and Ismayilli were also other hometowns that appeared to be prominent.
Units
At the beginning of 2013, Azerbaijani foreign fighters started out primarily fighting with the Azerbaijani jamaat of Jaysh al-Muhajirin val Ansar, led by the charismatic leader and face of Azerbaijani fighters in Syria, Nicat Ashurov (aka Abu Yahya al-Azeri). After Ashurov was killed in September 2013, the majority of Azerbaijani fighters appeared to have joined the Islamic State.
Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters 2014 d3 2
Islamic State
Though an Azerbaijani fighter appeared in photos posted by the Twitter account of the Bitar Battalion, a predominately Libyan affiliate of IS, there appear to be two primary units within IS in which Azerbaijanis fight. The first is a mixed Turkish-Azerbaijani unit previously based on Raqqa, which appears to have been engaged in Kobane. Ebuzer Sahin, a Turkish citizen and likely spiritual leader of the unit identified it on social media as the Cundullah (pronounced Jundullah) jamaat.
 

The second unit is another mixed group of Turkish and Azerbaijani fighters currently fighting in Iraq. On 8 November 2014, this group released a video via the Turkish-language version of al Hayat Media showing them eating a large meal together in Fallujah, Iraq. The video gained some prominence because one of the fighters complained about women being afraid of them. It’s possible this was the Jamaat Khattab, lead by Emir Khattab (more information on him below). Elshan Qurbanov, an alleged former IS fighter, who gave a televised interview after his arrest upon return to Azerbaijan, said he fought in a unit led by Khattab until he was wounded in Anbar Province, Iraq in August 2014. Azerbaijanis are also reportedly part of the Abu Kamil Jamaat, which is primarily a Chechen IS jamaat.

Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN)
Despite the majority of Azerbaijani foreign fighters appearing to fight with IS, there are at least several still fighting within various JAN units. In early 2014, Fariz Abdullayev from Sumqayit was reported killed in Syria. As recently as 18 December, Ruslan Aliyev was reported to have been killed fighting in attack on Wadi al-Deif military base in Idlib, likely fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra that was engaged there.
Azerbaijanis have also aided in the JAN-IS propaganda war. In May 2014, A pro-JAN Turkish language outlet Ummetislam.com, published an interview conducted by Turkish Islamist journalist Muhammed Isra with a man named Ebu Hasan Kerimov, an alleged IS defector who disparaged the group and its activities. He described how he travelled to Sanliurfa in southern Turkey and met with an IS facilitator who smuggled him into Raqqa via Tal Abyad.
Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters 2014 d3 4
Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters 2014 d3 3
Conversely an Azerbaijani was part of a major propaganda coup by IS against JAN. In February 2014, an English-speaking fighter calling himself Abu Muhammed al-Amriki briefly gained some prominence. In the video Abu Muhammed claimed that he had lived in the US for 10-11 years and described when he had left JAN to join IS. The video gained enough attention that Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, JAN’s emir personally responded to al-Amriki’s accusations. There is strong evidence that Abu Muhammed (who was reportedly killed by an airstrike in October 2014) was an Azerbaijani in reality (though he might have been a resident of the US at some point). First, Abu Muhammed appeared in a major address by Abu Yahya in May 2013. In the address, Abu Yahya calls on his countrymen to come to Syria and join the Azerbaijani jamaat of Jaysh al-Muhajirin val Ansar, indicating all the men appearing in the video. Besides the February video in which Abu Muhammed spoke English, he appeared in a number of other videos in which he exclusively spoke Russian. Second, Turkish IS member Ebuzer Sahin posted a photo of himself with Abu Muhammed, indicating that he was also from Azerbaijan. He was likely primarily a Russian speaker.
Leadership
The death of Ashurov (mentioned above) in September 2013 appears to have been a major blow to Azerbaijani fighters in Syria. Ashurov appears to have been communicating with contacts in Azerbaijan and trying to convince them to join the fight. Since Ashurov’s death, several other leaders have emerged, but none appear to command the same respect.
“Karabakh Partisans”
Some of the leadership came from an older cadre of Azerbaijani jihadis – including those who fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Several of the experienced Azerbaijani jihadis in Syria had been part of a group known as a “Karabakh Partisans.” This was a group of Azerbaijanis who fought in Chechnya and then desired to start a jihadi paramilitary campaign against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani security forces captured and imprisoned them in 2004. However, a number of those imprisoned were quietly released in 2010. One of these fighters was a highly respected fighter, Rustem Askerov, who was killed in 2013. More information about this fighter emerged in 2014. A journalist from al Jazeera Turkish interviewed Askerov’s mother, who still lives in Baku and is taking care of three of his children. Askerov had attended religious studies in Medina in 1998 before eventually going to fight in Chechnya.
Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters 2014 d3 5
Rovshan Badalov, a second member of the “Karabakh Partisans” was killed in Kobane in October 2014 – some reports claim he was killed in an airstrike, while others state he conducted a suicide attack. Like Rustem Askerov, Badalov had also fought in Chechnya in 2001, reportedly leading a group called the Tabuk jamaat. According to a report from Azerinfo, Badalov had connections to the pro-IS Turkish preacher

GUEST POST: Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria
By North Caucasus Caucus
Introduction
Untitled
Figure 1. An Azerbaijani fighter stands next to a captured tanker truck from the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) in Syria, Source: APA
Stories about Azerbaijanis fighting in Syria have appeared semi-regularly in the Azerbaijani media throughout 2013. Recent events have unleashed a flood of commentary, however, with at least seven Azerbaijanis killed during fighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic Front on 03 – 04 January 2014, including a 14-year-old boy from Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan. Now many political and religious pundits in the country have commented on or turned their attention to Azerbaijanis going to fight in Syria. The Azerbaijani government is beginning to take more public actions.
Terrorism and religious extremism have always remained marginal issues in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics, and accurate information is difficult to come by. Many of the details about plots and alleged plots often come from court reporting or detailed statements put out by the Ministry of National Security (MNS). The Azerbaijani government often overplays terrorism cases, in part as a way to solicit cooperation from the United States and other western countries.
The civil war in Syria is far different than previous conflicts in which Azerbaijanis have participated. For the first time, Azerbaijani fighters are speaking directly to audiences within Azerbaijan and elsewhere through videos and posts in social media. They are even able to interact continuously with their friends in Azerbaijan. No longer are researchers reliant solely on court documents or televised confessions, the validity of which are sometimes questionable. With more primary source material, an interesting and more richly detailed picture is emerging.
History of Azerbaijani Jihadi Activity: Afghanistan and Chechnya
Azerbaijanis have participated in a number of conflicts around the world – most notably in Chechnya and Afghanistan (though the author has found no reports of Azerbaijanis fighting in Iraq). Azerbaijan’s population of nine million is approximately 60% Shi’a and 40% Sunni and has overall low levels of religiosity.  It comes as a surprise to most Azerbaijanis that their countrymen would participate in jihad.
The MNS arrested 70 Azerbaijani citizens between 2001-2003 for attempting to travel to Chechnya. In a list complied by the author—based on media reports and video montages of Azerbaijani martyrs put out by extremist media outlets—between 1999 and 2013, at least 33 Azerbaijanis died in the North Caucasus, mainly during the years of the heaviest fighting (1999-2005), and at least 23 Azerbaijanis were killed in Afghanistan (including at least one suicide bomber). 200-250 Azerbaijanis reportedly fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2009, Azerbaijani police arrested 13 people for illegally crossing the border back into Azerbaijan from Iran after reportedly fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Untitled2
Figure 2. Left: INTERPOL released a red arrest notice for Jabir Mustafayev for terrorism charges; Right: Mustafayev appeared in a video honoring all the Azerbaijani fighters killed abroad in the period of 2007-2009, Source: YouTube
Azerbaijanis were even represented in the leadership of some prominent groups in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus. Azer Misirxanov aka Ebu Omer, who was killed in a US airstrike in 2009, was a high-ranking member of Taifetul Mansura in Afghanistan, led by Serdal Erbasi (aka Ebu zer), a Turkish citizen. Misirxanov, originally from the village of Khalafli in Jebrail District, had previously fought in the North Caucasus and was even arrested in 2001 but was released after only a year in prison for unknown reasons.
Untitled3
Figure 3. Azer Misirxanov (aka Emir Ebu Omer, right) appears with Serdal Erbasi in a 2009 video, Source: YouTube
First Appearance of Azerbaijani Fighters in Syria: Late 2012
The first report of an Azerbaijani fighter in Syria came in mid-August 2012 from a French journalist reporting in Aleppo. A Turkish war correspondent taken prisoner in Syria in May 2012 also reported seeing Azerbaijanis fighting with the Free Syrian Army.
The first concrete cases were in fall 2012. According to identification documents, including a passport and driver’s license that were photographed and posted online, Zaur Islamov was 37 years old and from the northern Azerbaijani city of Qusar, which borders Dagestan. The earliest known posting of Islamov’s photos was on 9 September 2012 on the forum, Shabka Ansar al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Supporters’ Network). Islamov’s name was also included on a pro-Assad Facebook page listing “terrorists” killed in various battles. At least one of the Azerbaijani fighters killed in Syria was part of Azer Misirxanov’s group in Afghanistan. In 2009, an Azerbaijani court sentenced Araz Kangarli to two and half years in prison for illegally crossing the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, weapons possession, participation in an illegal armed group for two months in 2008, and committing an illegal act overseas. He only served one year before being released and in November 2012 his mother received a phone call that her son had been killed.
In Press Medya, a Turkish pro-Syrian opposition news website, released photos of four Azerbaijani fighters killed in battle and several photos of living fighters. These pictures made it clear that more than just a handful of Azerbaijanis were in Syria. Since the end of 2012, reportedly around 100 Azerbaijanis have been killed in Syria. Based on media reports and postings by jihadi media outlets, the author has recorded 41 Azerbaijanis who have fought in Syria, 30 of whom were killed. Of course, the participation of many fighters is never recorded.
Where do they come from?
For a researcher on violent extremist groups in Azerbaijan, the hometowns of many of the fighters in Syria do not come as a surprise. They line up with the hometowns of Azerbaijanis who have fought in Chechnya or Afghanistan, as well as the locations of counter-terrorism operations within the country.
Based on media reporting and the author’s own database of biographical data, Azerbaijanis fighting in Syria primarily come from Baku, Sumqayit, and smaller towns in northern Azerbaijan such as Qusar, Xudat, Xacmaz, Zaqatala, and Qax. Press reporting has mentioned specifically the villages of Kohne Xacmaz, Muxax in Zaqatala District and the village of Quhuroba in Xacmaz District as being important hometowns of foreign fighters.  An article in the newspaper Musavat claimed that around 30 fighters came from Muxax alone. At least one fighter came from Terter (where in December 2008, three men wearing military uniforms attacked a military post in order to seize weapons for use in terrorist attacks). Sumqayit, the large industrial city just north of Baku, appears to be the most important source of Azerbaijani foreign fighters.
Connections of Hometowns of Foreign Fighters to Previous Terrorism
Untitled4
Figure 4. Map of Foreign Fighters Hometowns, Source: Google Maps
Sumqayit
Sumqayit has played a role in nearly every story on terrorism in Azerbaijan. In 2007, police claimed they broke up a group based in Sumqayit known as the “Abu Jafar” group. It was reportedly led by Naielm Abdul Kerim al-Bedevi, a Saudi citizen. Azerbaijani security services reported that al-Bedevi had been living in Sumqayit since 2001 and had travelled repeatedly to the North Caucasus.
In 2008, Russian and Azerbaijani media reported that Ilgar Mollachiyev helped establish a branch of the Dagestani “Forest Brothers” in Azerbaijan, creating two jamaats – one in Sumqayit and the other in Quba/Qusar. According to two alleged members of the group, Taleh Maherramov and Samir Babayev, Mollachiyev illegally crossed into Azerbaijan from Russia on 19 July 2008 along with an Arab known as “Dr. Muhammed,” traveling to Baku and Sumqayit. In August 2008, Mekhtiyev ordered Elnur Bashirov and another member of the group to attack the Abu Bakr Mosque, the most popular Sunni mosque in Azerbaijan (which has remained closed since the attack). The attack sparked a huge response from Azerbaijani security services against the pious Sunni community as a whole.
The Sumqayit jamaat was supposed to carry out robberies in Baku in order to gather the means to obtain weapons in order to commit attacks. A reported member of Emin Shikhaliyev explained during his trial that the Sumgayit jamaat was created not in order to commit crimes in Azerbaijan, but rather to provide help to the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Members of the group in September-November 2008 visited the village in Balakan District on the border with Georgia where