Check out my new article with Devorah Margolin in CTC Sentinel: “The Islamic State’s Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz”

Abstract: Since losing its last semblance of control in Syria in March 2019, the Islamic State has spent the last four and a half years not only attempting to survive, but also working to create the conditions for returning to territorial control. While it is true that the organization’s insurgency has been degraded in recent years, only focusing on the Islamic State’s attack claims and propaganda misses an important trend happening at the local level: Despite the best efforts of the Global Coalition Against the Islamic State and the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Islamic State has continued attempts to govern as shadow actors in eastern Syria. The Islamic State’s shadow governance efforts can be seen occurring on four main axes: taxes, moral policing, administrative documents, and retaking of territory (albeit for brief periods of time). The Islamic State’s level of governance today is nowhere near where it was when it controlled territory the size of Britain from 2014-2017. Yet, these governance attempts illustrate that the group may be stronger than many assume, while also highlighting that the group’s interest in governing and controlling territory has not waned in recent years.

Click here to read the research in full.

The Islamic State’s Fourth Bayat Campaign

Previously, I tracked the bayat campaign for Abu Ibrahim after Abu Bakr’s death, then for Abu al-Hasan after Abu Ibrahim’s death, and then for Abu al-Husayn after Abu al-Hasan’s death. This post will do the same with the announcement of Abu al-Husayn’s death and Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quarashi as the new leader of the Islamic State. As I said in the original post:

There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.

The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.

This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.

August 5, 2023:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region

August 6, 2023:

Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl

Wilāyat al-Yaman

August 7, 2023:

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Tri-Border Area

Wilāyat Bākistān

August 8, 2023:

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane

August 9, 2023:

Wilāyat Khurāsān

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh

August 10, 2023:

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region and Banki Region

August 11, 2023:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

August 12, 2023:

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

August 14, 2023:

Wilāyat Mūzambīq

Wilāyat Bākistān

Wilāyat Sāḥil – Burkina Faso

August 16, 2023:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat al-Shām

The Islamic State’s Third Bayat Campaign

Previously, I tracked the bayat campaign for Abu Ibrahim after Abu Bakr’s death and then for Abu al-Hasan after Abu Ibrahim’s death. This post will do the same with the announcement of Abu al-Hasan’s death and Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi as the new leader of the Islamic State. As I said in the original post:

There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.

The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.

This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.

December 1, 2022: 

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region

Wilāyat Khurāsān

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region

December 2:

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Banki Region

December 3: 

Wilāyat al-Yaman

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh, Tri-Border, and Burkina Faso Regions

December 4: 

Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane Village

December 5:

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Central Nigeria

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat Bākistān

Wilāyat Mūzambīq

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah – Beni Region

December 7, 2022:

Tūnis

Wilāyat al-Hind – Kashmir

Wilāyat Mūzambīq – Nangade Region

December 8, 2022:

Lubnān

December 14, 2022:

Wilāyat Saynā’

December 17, 2022:

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

December 19:

Wilāyat Lībīyā

New statement from Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām’s Ḍīyā’ al-‘Umar: “Regarding the Arrest of Leaders of What is Known as Wilayat al-Sham, Affiliated With The Islamic State”

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḍīyā’ al-‘Umar — Regarding the Arrest of Leaders of What is Known as Wilayat al-Sham, Affiliated With The Islamic State

________________

Source: Telegram

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

The Islamic State’s Second Bayat Campaign

Following the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, I tracked the new bayat coming in for the new leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. This post will do the same with the announcement of Abu Ibrahim’s death and Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as the new leader of the Islamic State. As I said in the original post:

There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.

The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.

This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.

March 11, 2022:

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Karkūk

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Lake Chad Basin

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

March 12, 2022: 

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – al-Ānbār

Wilāyat al-Yaman

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn

Wilāyat Khurāsān

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – al-Faruq Region

Wilāyat Lībīyā

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Sambissa

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Sahel Region

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Kerenoa Region

Wilāyat Bākistān

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Shamāl Baghdād

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – al-Janūb

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Diyālā‎

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Nīnawā

Wilāyat al-Hind

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Dijlah

 Wilāyat Saynā’

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah